China is on a mission to turn its military into a modern fighting force. In the final article in this four-part series, we look at President Xi Jinping’s military goals and obstacles facing the People’s Liberation Army. The 80th anniversary of China’s victory over Japan in World War II is intended to display both the strength and solidarity of the People’s Liberation Army. But just two weeks before it is set to take place, Beijing announced that former navy chief of staff Li Hanjun – a veteran who took part in similar parades in 1984 and 2009 – had been removed as a delegate in the national legislature on suspicion of “serious violations of discipline and law”, a euphemism for corruption. Li’s downfall, announced before this year’s massive parade on September 3, seems to underline two simultaneous trends: the PLA’s rapid pace of modernisation, and a determined campaign to net corrupt generals. While some question if the hunt for corruption will hamper the PLA’s war readiness, others argue it shows Beijing’s determination to create a fighting force “capable of winning wars”, as President Xi Jinping has repeatedly emphasised. The world may be better able to answer this question next week when Beijing showcases its latest weapons and a new generation of commanders. It has been eight years since Xi set the goal of “building a world class military by the middle of the century”, a target understood to put the PLA on a par with the United States. In another key report, delivered at the 20th Party Congress in 2022, Xi said the PLA must be able to “win local wars”. And, as Xi inspects formations next month, the PLA will be less than two years from its “centennial goal” deadline on August 1, 2027. While there are few publicly available details, observers have estimated potential implications of the target, including regarding Taiwan. Analysts believe the comprehensive planning of PLA strategic objectives – such as capacities near Taiwan – seems largely on track, and there are many in China who argue that Xi’s campaign will improve, not worsen, his country’s readiness for combat. However, corruption is not the only obstacle the PLA must face. It also has to overcome slower economic growth and an ageing population to meet its goals. And strict technological controls imposed by China’s main rival, the United States, are considered a potential factor affecting progress. The centennial goal and Taiwan While Beijing has been deliberately vague about the development goals for its military for 2027, 2030 and 2049, many observers use the PLA’s readiness to take Taiwan by force as a yardstick. Some US officials, including Admiral John Aquilino, head of the US Indo-Pacific Command, and former CIA director William Burns, said the PLA would act to take Taiwan by 2027. However, Beijing has stated that “peaceful reunification” remains its preferred option. Xi has repeatedly emphasised that Beijing is willing to achieve this with “utmost sincerity” through the “one country, two systems” arrangement. Fu Qianshao, a military analyst and a former member of the PLA air force, said that regardless of Beijing’s strategy, its military must ensure it has the capabilities to prevent Taiwan from seeking full independence. Beijing considers Taiwan part of China and will use force to achieve reunification if necessary. Most countries do not recognise Taiwan as an independent state, including the US, Taiwan’s main arms supplier. However, Washington opposes any attempt to change the status quo by force. At next month’s military parade, the PLA is expected to showcase advanced weapons, including its latest fifth-generation fighter jet, intercontinental ballistic missiles, amphibious armoured vehicles and cutting-edge unmanned vehicles. Most could play a key role in a possible Taiwan conflict under the aims of amphibious attack, air dominance or blocking external intervention. Since William Lai Ching-te, of the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), became Taiwan’s leader last year, the PLA has held several large-scale military exercises around Taiwan, aimed at deterring what Beijing views as provocative actions to push the island to lean further towards independence. “Resolving the Taiwan issue is one of the PLA’s most important tasks,” Fu said, adding that Taiwan would be front of mind as the PLA developed training and equipment. Fu said the PLA’s main goal was to “safeguard national security, sovereignty and territorial integrity” as well as “resisting external provocation”. “The ultimate goal is clear: to achieve reunification,” he said. Tai Ming Cheung, professor at the University of California, San Diego’s (UCSD) School of Global Policy and Strategy and director of the University of California’s Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, also saw Taiwan as the most important aspect of China’s military goal. He said it referred to “the operational attainment of joint tactical-level combat capabilities able to effectively project Chinese war-fighting capabilities” while aiming to “dissuade major powers … from intervening in potential conflicts in the Asia-Pacific, of which the Taiwan Strait is of foremost importance”. But neither believes that connection suggests a possible timeline for the PLA to launch an operation against Taiwan. Recent signalling by the PLA has hinted at progress in its capacities near Taiwan. In a documentary aired this month, the PLA showcased its advanced amphibious assault and landing capabilities, apparently targeting Taiwan, and rare progress in intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), which are believed to be a major deterrent for US warships and military bases in the region. Coordination drills between two Chinese aircraft carriers that are key to its strategy of blocking a US intervention, started in the West Pacific in October, while China’s third aircraft carrier awaits entry into service, likely to be this year. The PLA’s daily manoeuvring near Taiwan has also grown in size, become more complicated and is getting closer to more of the island. Song Zhongping, a military commentator and former PLA instructor, said that with the appearance of new weapons and the completion of military reforms, the PLA’s centennial goal “is being realised step by step and will be achieved by 2027”. However, Song shared an alternative view aired by some analysts suggesting that Beijing’s military might be guided by a target other than Taiwan. Song said the US was Beijing’s target, and that the PLA’s centennial goals “have little to do with Taiwan, which is not the main focus of our military development”. “The US does pose a significant threat to China, so it is essential that we build a first-class military to ensure the security of our country and resist the challenges posed by major military powers, including the US.” Mark Cozad, a senior international defence researcher and professor at the Rand School of Public Policy, believes the PLA “has made substantial progress in terms of its technological modernisation and the quality and quantity of its weapons systems”. But Cozad said the “continuing challenge for the PLA” was that “corruption, operational proficiency, leadership and command, and political reliability remain significant problems for the PLA, particularly in Xi’s eyes”. Impact of anti-corruption campaign In the past three years, the anti-corruption campaign into PLA leadership has accelerated significantly, disgracing two of the seven-man Central Military Commission, the powerful commanding body led by Xi: former defence minister Li Shangfu and political work officer Miao Hua. A third member, its vice-chair He Weidong, has been missing for five months, and former defence minister Wei Fenghe has been sacked. Generals in various units, including the rocket force, army, navy and the equipment sector, have also been hunted down by graft fighters. The pace of anti-graft probes has led to questions about the PLA’s war readiness. Dennis Wilder, professor of practice at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and senior fellow at Georgetown’s Initiative for US-China Dialogue on Global Issues, said “high command turbulence may lead officers to become risk averse, and that will affect combat planning”. Cozad, of the Rand School of Public Policy, said “the most significant impact that the anti-corruption campaign will likely have is on PLA commanders’ decision-making and their willingness to demonstrate greater initiative and creative thinking”. But Timothy Heath, a senior international defence researcher at the US-based Rand organisation, believed the anti-corruption campaign would not significantly affect PLA modernisation or “result in a shortage of combat-capable leaders”. Some of China’s fallen generals had extensive experience related to Taiwan. Miao Hua and He Weidong both served for many years in Fujian, a province opposite the strait of Taiwan that is expected to play a central role in preparing for a conflict across the strait. But their departure would not seriously affect decision-making in a potential Taiwan conflict, said Lu Li-Shih, a former instructor at the Taiwanese Naval Academy in Kaohsiung and a former captain in Taiwan’s navy. He said that in exercises targeting Taiwan, the PLA’s approach had been established, “which is to simulate attacks on Taiwan’s regional infrastructure, not the general public”. “The absence of any individual will not affect overall decision-making,” Lu said. Chinese military commentator Song said the purge of corrupt generals was “precisely an important manifestation of making the military purer and more combat-effective”. US tech controls From the outset, the modernisation of the PLA has preoccupied Washington, which first rolled out export restrictions on chips for the Chinese market during US President Donald Trump’s first term. Washington doubled down on those efforts last month, with export restrictions placing a sharper focus on AI models – a defining factor in future warfare. However, China has advanced its own technologies through domestic innovation in recent years. Thomas Shipley, an analyst at Oxford Analytica, a global analysis and advisory firm, wrote that China’s defence sector could face short-term hurdles because of limited access to advanced AI systems. But the PLA might accelerate domestic AI research to mitigate the effects of US restrictions, Shipley wrote in an article published on the firm’s website in November. According to a report last month, the Mercator Institute for China Studies (Merics), a non-profit German think tank, found China was pursuing AI self-reliance at every level of technology and Beijing had made “independent and controllable” AI a key objective. Merics found that China’s semiconductor industry had produced its own AI chips, but their performance did not yet match that of US semiconductor designer Nvidia. However, in models and applications, China had closed in on the US and, coupled with a protected home market, given rise to large language model (LLM) developers such as DeepSeek. Hardware challenges still hindered wider deployment, but the local adoption of LLMs remained high, and China’s AI industry was pivoting towards specialised applications, the report said. Although imports are still required for some high-end chips, Beijing has repeatedly stated its determination to rapidly make this sector local. This month, Beijing mandated that public computing centres procure more than 50 per cent of their chips from domestic manufacturers to support China’s semiconductor industry. The requirement is even more stringent in sensitive sectors such as defence and aerospace, with several defence suppliers stating that Beijing requires military institutions to achieve 100 per cent domestic production of “core systems”. Song said that China was “giving priority” to chip development in the military and aerospace sectors, and although this was “very costly, it would ensure security and reliability”. Slower economic growth Another factor commonly cited as a potential stumbling block for China’s efforts to modernise the PLA is its slowing economy. Recent headwinds include high youth unemployment, weak consumer spending, massive local government debt and a rapidly declining real estate market, resulting in a significant decline in GDP growth compared with a decade ago. Although at around 5 per cent, it is still higher than that of other major economies. However, data suggests there is no sign of slower spending on China’s military – the second largest in the world and growing an average 7.2 per cent over the past three years. Mainland military analyst Fu said that “despite the changes in the international situation, it is appropriate for military spending to slightly exceed GDP growth … A growth rate of 7.2 per cent is sufficient to support the 2027 target”. He said China’s defence budget was “a much lower percentage” of the country’s GDP compared to the US, whose defence budget growth faced challenges such as inflation. Compared with major powers, China’s military spending as a percentage of GDP is not high and appears to have room for growth. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), China’s military spending last year accounted for 1.7 per cent of its GDP. US military spending accounted for 3.5 per cent of its GDP, while Russia’s was around 7.1 per cent. South Korea spent 2.4 per cent of its GDP on defence, and Japan has set a 2 per cent target for 2027. Instead, Beijing has emphasised that military spending must be “used more efficiently”. Compared with militaries in the US and Europe, which have repeatedly experienced delays in the delivery of key weapon platforms, such as aircraft carriers and next-generation fighters, the PLA’s arsenal seems to have grown at a steady pace, with public plans to further expand its production lines. For recruitment, the economic downward pressure might even aid military recruitment in China, according to Heath. “On the positive side, higher numbers of unemployed educated youth could improve the PLA’s recruitment prospects. On the negative side, there may be downward pressure on defence budgets,” he said. PLA official media outlets have repeatedly discussed the military value of AI and humanoid robot technologies. Song said China’s economy had “growing pains” as it transitioned from labour-intensive to technology-intensive – something the country’s military would also undergo during its own transformation. “Despite the apparent slowdown in China’s economic growth, our investment in defence remains unwavering,” Song said. He said that in terms of industrial capacity, “China has a complete industrial chain and supporting chain … which is crucial for the indigenisation of the military industry system”. Compared with developed countries, China’s labour and land costs were lower, reducing the overall cost of military research and development, he said. Lack of war experience Analysts believe the true obstacle to be overcome by the PLA by 2027 is a lack of experience, especially given that the PLA has not fought a war in four decades. Cozad of the Rand School of Public Policy said a “key component” of the PLA’s efforts to achieve its 2027 goal was “overcoming and improving institutional and organisational shortfalls, such as training, doctrine development, developing personnel and implementing new concepts of operation”. Heath also saw training and experience as crucial elements of the PLA goal. “The bigger constraint is the lack of experience and inadequate training and education system,” he said. “Even without the anti-corruption campaign, the PLA faces a shortage in skilled commanders and staff capable of fighting a modern war.”