By the authority granted to me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)(IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.)(NEA), section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (19 U.S.C. 2483), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, recognize that various conditions—including the absence of reciprocity in our trade relationships, unequal tariff rates, and the economic policies of our trading partners that suppress domestic wages and consumption—have resulted in significant and persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits. These factors pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and economy of the United States. This threat originates largely from external domestic economic policies of pivotal trading partners and the structural imbalances within the global trade framework. Therefore, I hereby declare a national emergency in response to this threat. On January 20, 2025, I signed the America First Trade Policy Presidential Memorandum, instructing my Administration to explore the reasons behind our nation’s substantial and ongoing goods trade deficits, including the economic and national security ramifications thereof, and to identify any unfair trade practices by other nations. On February 13, 2025, I issued a Presidential Memorandum titled “Reciprocal Trade and Tariffs,” which mandated further examination of non-reciprocal trading practices among our trading partners, noting the connection between these practices and the trade deficit. On April 1, 2025, I received the final findings from those investigations and am acting today based on those findings. The ongoing and substantial U.S. goods trade deficits have eroded our manufacturing capability; impeded our capacity for advanced domestic manufacturing growth; weakened vital supply chains; and made our defense-industrial base reliant on foreign adversaries. These persistent trade deficits significantly stem from a lack of reciprocity in our bilateral trade agreements, which is evidenced by imbalanced tariff rates and non-tariff barriers that hinder U.S. manufacturers’ ability to export their goods in foreign markets. Furthermore, the economic policies of key trading allies suppress domestic wages and consumption, thereby curtailing demand for U.S. products abroad while unduly enhancing the competitiveness of their exports. This situation has led to the national emergency that this order aims to address. Since 1934, U.S. trade policy has been founded on the principle of reciprocity. Congress instructed the President to negotiate reduced reciprocal tariff rates with key trading partners initially through bilateral agreements and later within the global trading framework. From 1934 to 1945, the executive branch successfully negotiated and ratified 32 bilateral reciprocal trade agreements aimed at reducing tariffs on a reciprocal basis. Between 1947 and 1994, the participating nations engaged in eight negotiation rounds that culminated in the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and seven following tariff reduction cycles. However, despite a commitment to reciprocity, the trade relationship between the U.S. and its partners has become increasingly unbalanced in recent years. The post-war international economic order was predicated on three flawed assumptions: first, that if the U.S. led the world in removing tariff and non-tariff barriers, other nations would follow suit; second, that such liberalization would eventually lead to greater economic convergence and rising domestic consumption within U.S. trading nations; and third, that as a consequence, the U.S. would not experience large, persistent goods trade deficits. This framework initiated a series of agreements and commitments that failed to achieve reciprocity or raise domestic consumption in foreign economies relative to the U.S. As a result, large, chronic U.S. goods trade deficits emerged as a characteristic of the global trade system. In essence, while World Trade Organization (WTO) Members agreed to bind their tariff rates on a most-favored-nation (MFN) basis, they did not commit to binding their tariff rates at comparably low levels or apply them reciprocally. Consequently, according to the WTO, the U.S. holds some of the lowest average MFN tariff rates globally, at 3.3 percent, whereas many key trading partners—such as Brazil (11.2 percent), China (7.5 percent), the European Union (5 percent), India (17 percent), and Vietnam (9.4 percent)—have significantly higher average MFN tariff rates. Moreover, these average MFN tariff rates mask much larger disparities in tariff rates applied to specific products. For instance, the U.S. imposes a 2.5 percent tariff on imports of passenger vehicles (with internal combustion engines), while the European Union (10 percent), India (70 percent), and China (15 percent) enforce much steeper tariffs on the same imports. For network switches and routers, the U.S. maintains a 0 percent tariff, contrasting with India’s 10 percent duty on similar goods. Brazil (18 percent) and Indonesia (30 percent) impose higher tariffs on ethanol compared to the U.S. (2.5 percent). When it comes to husked rice, the U.S. MFN tariff stands at 2.7 percent, while India (80 percent), Malaysia (40 percent), and Turkey (an average of 31 percent) charge higher tariffs. While apples can enter the U.S. duty-free, they face tariffs in Turkey (60.3 percent) and India (50 percent). Non-tariff barriers further restrict U.S. manufacturers’ access to global markets. The 2025 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers (NTE) outlines numerous non-tariff barriers affecting U.S. exports, detailing restrictions imposed by individual trading partners. These barriers encompass import restrictions and licensing protocols; customs challenges and trade facilitation weaknesses; technical trade barriers (e.g., excessively restrictive standards, conformity assessment procedures, or technical regulations); sanitary and phytosanitary measures that unnecessarily limit trade without promoting safety; inadequate protections for patents, copyrights, trade secrets, and trademarks; discriminatory licensing requirements or regulatory standards; barriers impacting cross-border data flows and biased practices regarding digital goods trade; investment hindrances; subsidies; anti-competitive practices; favoritism towards domestic state-owned enterprises; government shortcomings in labor and environmental standards; bribery; and corruption. Non-tariff barriers also encompass the domestic economic policies of our trading partners, including currency practices and value-added taxes, which create market distortions that suppress domestic consumption and enhance exports to the U.S. This lack of reciprocity is evident, considering that the share of consumption to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the U.S. is approximately 68 percent; in comparison, it is much lower in countries like Ireland (27 percent), Singapore (31 percent), China (39 percent), South Korea (49 percent), and Germany (50 percent). At the same time, the U.S. has encountered setbacks in efforts to address these disparities. Trading partners have consistently obstructed multilateral and plurilateral solutions, including new tariff negotiations and measures to regulate non-tariff barriers. With the U.S. economy being disproportionately open to imports, there have been limited incentives for foreign partners to offer reciprocal treatment to U.S. exports during bilateral trade talks. These structural imbalances have resulted in the substantial and ongoing U.S. goods trade deficit. Even in cases where the U.S. may register a temporary bilateral trade surplus with some nations, the accumulation of tariff and non-tariff barriers on U.S. exports can shrink that surplus compared to what it might have been absent those barriers. Allowing these imbalances to persist is not viable in the current economic and geopolitical landscape due to the detrimental effects on U.S. domestic production. A nation’s capacity for domestic production is fundamental to its national and economic security. Both during my first Administration in 2017 and under the Biden Administration in 2022, it has been acknowledged that boosting domestic manufacturing is crucial for U.S. national security. According to 2023 data from the United Nations, U.S. manufacturing output constitutes 17.4 percent of global manufacturing output, down from a peak of 28.4 percent in 2001. The enduring decline in U.S. manufacturing output has diminished U.S. manufacturing capabilities. It is vital to uphold robust and resilient domestic manufacturing capacities, especially in advanced industrial sectors like automobiles, shipbuilding, pharmaceuticals, technology products, machine tools, and basic and fabricated metals since once competitors gain sufficient market share in these sectors, U.S. production could face permanent attrition. Enhancing manufacturing capacity in the defense-industrial sector is equally essential to ensure we produce the defense materiel and equipment necessary to safeguard American interests domestically and internationally. Indeed, due to the substantial military equipment supplied by the U.S. to foreign nations, our stockpiles of military resources have diminished to levels incompatible with U.S. defense interests. Moreover, U.S. defense firms must innovate new advanced manufacturing technologies across crucial sectors, including bio-manufacturing, batteries, and microelectronics. To maintain a robust security network to protect our citizens and homeland, as well as our allies and partners, the U.S. must foster a large upstream manufacturing ecosystem capable of producing these goods without excessive reliance on imports for critical inputs. The growing dependence on foreign producers for goods has also jeopardized U.S. economic security by exposing supply chains to potential geopolitical disturbances and supply shocks. Recent years have revealed this vulnerability—highlighted during the COVID-19 pandemic, when Americans found it challenging to access essential goods, and later illustrated by Houthi rebel attacks on cargo vessels in the Middle East. The decline of U.S. manufacturing capability poses additional threats to the economy through job losses. Between 1997 and 2024, the U.S. lost around 5 million manufacturing jobs, experiencing one of the most significant drops in manufacturing employment recorded. Job losses in manufacturing were particularly concentrated in specific regions, contributing to declines in family formation rates and a rise in social issues such as opioid abuse, which have exacted significant tolls on the economy. The future of American competitiveness hinges on reversing these trends. Currently, manufacturing makes up only 11 percent of U.S. gross domestic product but accounts for 35 percent of American productivity growth and 60 percent of our exports. Notably, U.S. manufacturing is the primary source of innovation in the country, responsible for 55 percent of all patents and 70 percent of research and development (R&D) expenditures. The fact that R&D investment by U.S. multinational companies in China surged at an average of 13.6 percent per year between 2003 and 2017, while their R&D Spending in the U.S. increased by only 5 percent per year over the same period, underscores the strong correlation between manufacturing and innovation. Additionally, each manufacturing job generates 7 to 12 additional jobs in related industries, contributing to economic growth. Just as a nation that cannot produce manufactured goods struggles to maintain the industrial capacity needed for national security, a nation that cannot produce its own food is equally vulnerable. Presidential Policy Directive 21 of February 12, 2013 (Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience), identifies food and agriculture as a “critical infrastructure sector” because it is vital to the United States and its incapacity could severely impact security, national economic security, public health, or safety, or a combination thereof. Furthermore, when I left office, the U.S. possessed a trade surplus in agricultural products; however, that surplus has now evaporated, eroded by a multitude of new non-tariff barriers imposed by trading partners, resulting in a projected $49 billion annual agricultural trade deficit. For these reasons, I hereby declare and order: Section 1. National Emergency. As the President of the United States, my highest obligation is ensuring the national and economic security of the country and its citizens. I have proclaimed a national emergency resulting from the widespread large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits, which have increased by over 40 percent in the last five years alone, reaching $1.2 trillion in 2024. This trade deficit illustrates imbalances in trade relationships that have contributed to the decline of domestic production capacity, particularly affecting the U.S. manufacturing and defense-industrial base. These imbalances also hinder U.S. producers’ export capabilities and, subsequently, their motivation to produce. Specifically, such imbalances encompass not merely non-reciprocal tariff discrepancies among foreign trading partners, but also the extensive reliance on non-tariff barriers by foreign trading partners that diminish the competitiveness of U.S. exports while artificially enhancing the appeal of their own products. These non-tariff barriers consist of technical trade restrictions; non-scientific sanitary and phytosanitary regulations; inadequate protections for intellectual property; domestic consumption suppression (e.g., wage suppression); lax labor, environmental, and other regulations; and corruption. These non-tariff barriers result in significant disparities even when the U.S. and a trading partner maintain comparable tariff rates. The cumulative effects of these disparities have transferred resources from domestic producers to foreign entities, diminishing chances for domestic manufacturers to grow and subsequently leading to job losses, reduced manufacturing capabilities, and a weakened industrial foundation, including in the defense sector. In parallel, foreign firms are increasingly positioned to enhance production, reinvest in innovation, and compete robustly in the global market, to the detriment of U.S. economic and national security. The inadequate domestic manufacturing capacity in certain critical and advanced industrial fields—another result of the sustained large annual U.S. goods trade deficits—further jeopardizes U.S. economic and national security by making the U.S. economy less resilient to supply chain disruptions. Ultimately, the extensive and ongoing U.S. goods trade deficits, alongside the corresponding reduction in industrial capacity, have compromised military readiness, an issue that can only be addressed through prompt corrective measures aimed at rebalancing import flows into the U.S. This impact on military readiness and our national security posture is especially urgent given the surge of armed conflicts abroad. I call upon both public and private sectors to undertake necessary actions to fortify the international economic position of the United States. Sec. 2. Reciprocal Tariff Policy. The policy of the United States shall be to rebalance global trade dynamics by imposing an additional ad valorem duty on all imports from all trading partners, except as otherwise specified herein. The initial additional ad valorem duty on all imports from all trading partners shall be set at 10 percent. Subsequently, this additional ad valorem duty shall increase for the trading partners listed in Annex I of this order to the rates set forth therein. These additional ad valorem duties will remain in effect until I determine that the aforementioned conditions have been rectified, addressed, or alleviated. Sec. 3. Implementation. (a) Unless stated otherwise in this order, all items imported into the customs territory of the United States shall be subject to an additional ad valorem duty of 10 percent, in accordance with the law. Such duty rates will apply to goods entered for consumption or withdrawn from the warehouse for consumption on or after 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on April 5, 2025. However, goods loaded onto a vessel at the loading port and in transit on the last mode of transport before 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on April 5, 2025, and entered for consumption or withdrawn from the warehouse for consumption thereafter shall not be subjected to this additional duty. Additionally, except as otherwise indicated in this order at 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on April 9, 2025, all items from trading partners mentioned in Annex I that are imported into the customs territory of the United States shall be subject to the country-specific ad valorem duty rates outlined in Annex I of this order. These duty rates will apply to goods entered for consumption or withdrawn from the warehouse for consumption on or after 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on April 9, 2025. However, items loaded onto a vessel at the port of loading and in transit before 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on April 9, 2025, and entered for consumption or withdrawn from the warehouse after that time shall not incur these country-specific ad valorem duties described in Annex I of this order. The country-specific ad valorem duty rates shall be applicable to all items imported under the terms of existing U.S. trade agreements, except as mentioned below. (b) The following goods listed in Annex II of this order shall not be liable for the ad valorem duty rates stipulated under this order, consistent with law: (i) all articles covered by 50 U.S.C. 1702(b); (ii) all articles and derivatives of steel and aluminum subject to duties imposed under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and as proclaimed in Proclamation 9704 of March 8, 2018 (Adjusting Imports of Aluminum Into the United States), as amended, Proclamation 9705 of March 8, 2018 (Adjusting Imports of Steel Into the United States), as amended, and Proclamation 9980 of January 24, 2020 (Adjusting Imports of Derivative Aluminum Articles and Derivative Steel Articles Into the United States), as amended, Proclamation 10895 of February 10, 2025 (Adjusting Imports of Aluminum Into the United States), and Proclamation 10896 of February 10, 2025 (Adjusting Imports of Steel into the United States); (iii) all automobiles and automotive parts subject to additional duties imposed under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, and proclaimed in Proclamation 10908 of March 26, 2025 (Adjusting Imports of Automobiles and Automobile Parts Into the United States); (iv) other products detailed in Annex II of this order, including copper, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, lumber goods, certain critical minerals, and energy and energy products; (v) all articles from a trading partner subject to the rates stated in Column 2 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS); and (vi) all articles that may become subject to duties under future measures enacted under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. (c) The duty rates established by this order are supplementary to any other applicable duties, fees, taxes, exactions, or charges related to such imported goods, except as provided in subsections (d) and (e) below. (d) For articles from Canada, I have implemented additional duties on specific goods to address a national emergency linked to the influx of illicit drugs across our northern border, in accordance with Executive Order 14193 of February 1, 2025 (Imposing Duties To Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Across Our Northern Border), as amended by Executive Order 14197 of February 3, 2025 (Progress on the Situation at Our Northern Border), and Executive Order 14231 of March 2, 2025 (Amendment to Duties To Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Across Our Northern Border). In relation to goods from Mexico, I have enacted additional duties on certain items to combat a national emergency stemming from the flow of illicit drugs and illegal migration across our southern border pursuant to Executive Order 14194 of February 1, 2025 (Imposing Duties To Address the Situation at Our Southern Border), as amended by Executive Order 14198 of February 3, 2025 (Progress on the Situation at Our Southern Border), and Executive Order 14227 of March 2, 2025 (Amendment to Duties To Address the Situation at Our Southern Border). As a consequence of these emergency tariff measures pertaining to borders, all goods originating from Canada or Mexico under the terms of general note 11 to the HTSUS, inclusive of any treatments outlined in subchapter XXIII of chapter 98 and subchapter XXII of chapter 99 of the HTSUS concerning the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), remain eligible for entry into the U.S. market under these preferential conditions. However, all goods from Canada or Mexico that do not qualify as originating according to USMCA are currently subject to additional ad valorem duties of 25 percent, with energy or energy resources and potash imported from Canada that do not qualify as originating under USMCA subject to a lesser additional ad valorem duty of 10 percent. (e) No ad valorem duty on articles imported from Canada or Mexico based on this order shall be imposed in addition to the ad valorem duty specified by existing orders described in subsection (d) above. If those orders referenced in subsection (d) are discontinued or suspended, all items from Canada and Mexico that qualify as originating under USMCA shall not face an additional ad valorem duty. Conversely, articles not originating under USMCA shall be subject to an additional ad valorem duty of 12 percent. However, these ad valorem duties on items imported from Canada and Mexico shall not apply to energy or energy resources, to potash, or to any article eligible for duty-free treatment under USMCA that constitutes a part or component of an article substantially finished in the United States. (f) In general, the ad valorem duty rates articulated in this order shall be applicable solely to the non-U.S. content of a concerned product, provided that at least 20 percent of its value is attributable to U.S. origin. For purposes of this subsection, “U.S. content” refers to the value of an article attributed to components produced wholly or significantly transformed within the United States. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is authorized, to the extent permitted by law, to require documentation and information regarding an imported article necessary to ascertain and verify the value of its U.S. content as well as to determine whether an article is substantially produced in the United States. (g) Subject articles received, excluding those qualifying for admission as “domestic status” defined in 19 CFR 146.43, that are subject to the duties specified in section 2 of this order and are admitted into a foreign trade zone post 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on April 9, 2025, must be designated as “privileged foreign status” in accordance with 19 CFR 146.41. (h) Duty-free treatment under 19 U.S.C. 1321(a)(2)(A)-(B) shall persist for the articles outlined in subsection (a) of this section. Duty-free treatment under 19 U.S.C. 1321(a)(2)(C) shall continue to be available for the articles specified in subsection (a) of this section until the Secretary of Commerce notifies the President that adequate systems are established to fully and efficiently process and collect the duty revenue applicable according to this subsection for articles otherwise eligible for duty-free consideration. Following such notification, duty-free treatment under 19 U.S.C. 1321(a)(2)(C) shall no longer be available for the articles cited in subsection (a) of this section. (i) The Executive Order dated April 2, 2025 (Further Amendment to Duties Addressing the Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in the People’s Republic of China concerning Low-Value Imports) remains undisturbed by this order, and all duties and fees regarding related articles shall be collected as stipulated therein. (j) To mitigate the risk of transshipment and evasion, all ad valorem duties set forth by this order or any subsequent orders concerning articles from China shall equally apply to articles originating from both the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Macau Special Administrative Region. (k) To establish the duty rates described in this order, the HTSUS will be modified as indicated in the Annexes to this order. These modifications will take effect on the dates specified in the Annexes. (l) Unless explicitly noted otherwise herein, any prior Presidential Proclamation, Executive Order, or other Presidential guidance pertaining to trade with foreign partners that conflicts with the directives of this order is immediately terminated, suspended, or modified as needed to ensure full enforcement of this order. Sec. 4. Modification Authority. (a) The Secretary of Commerce and the United States Trade Representative, in collaboration with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, the Senior Counselor for Trade and Manufacturing, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, shall recommend to me further actions if necessary, should the actions taken fail to effectively address the emergency conditions outlined above, including the increase in the overall trade deficit or the recent expansion of non-reciprocal trade agreements by U.S. trading partners that threaten the economic and national security interests of the United States. (b) Should any trading partner retaliate against the United States in response to these measures through import duties on U.S. exports or other actions, I may enhance the HTSUS to escalate or broaden the duties imposed under this order in order to preserve the effectiveness of this action. (c) Should any trading partner take significant measures to adjust non-reciprocal trade agreements and align with the United States on economic and national security priorities, I may make further modifications to HTSUS to decrease or limit the scope of the duties enacted in this order. (d) Should the situation regarding U.S. manufacturing capacity and output continue to decline, I may further adjust the HTSUS to increase duties in line with this order. Sec. 5. Implementation Authority. The Secretary of Commerce and the United States Trade Representative, in conjunction with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, the Senior Counselor for Trade and Manufacturing, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the Chair of the International Trade Commission are hereby empowered to employ all authorities granted to the President by IEEPA as needed to enact this order. Each executive department and agency is to take all appropriate measures within its jurisdiction to implement this order. Sec. 6. Reporting Requirements. The United States Trade Representative, alongside the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, the Senior Counselor for Trade and Manufacturing, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, is hereby authorized to submit periodic and final reports to Congress regarding the national emergency declared in this order, in accordance with section 401(c) of the NEA (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)) and section 204(c) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1703(c)). Sec. 7. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be interpreted as impairing or otherwise affecting: (i) the authority granted by law to any executive department, agency, or its head; or (ii) the responsibilities of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget related to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals. (b) This order shall be executed in accordance with applicable law and subject to the availability of funding. (c) This order does not intend to, and does not, create any rights or benefits, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other individual. DONALD J. TRUMP THE WHITE HOUSE, April 2, 2025.