This week Australia announced that it intends to purchase 11, updated Mogami Class frigates from Japan. Australia’s 2024 National Defence Strategy stated that the nation would significantly increase the size and combat capability of the Royal Australian Navy, including acquisition of 11 new general-purpose frigates. It is no secret that Australia is concerned about security in the region and is investing heavily in expanding its naval capabilities. Alongside this purchase, Australia also plans to procure six new Hunter Class large anti-submarine warfare frigates, and modernise three existing Hobart Class air-defence destroyers. In total Australia’s plan will expand the navy’s surface combat fleet from 10 warships to 20, but the number of warships is only one measure of the nation’s expanding surface warfare capability that will also include a six large optionally crewed vessels and modernisation of weapons systems. The purchase is noteworthy for other reasons too, the first of which is that it demonstrates the increasing integration of the US / NATO defence industrial base with other partners like Japan. Frigates, fighter planes and guided missiles are all examples of highly technical equipment that is most effective when it can operate effectively across an alliance of different nations. Historically, the US and NATO powers have spent the last 75 years working to ensure that they use technology, training and procedures to allow the alliance to operate together in battle. An important part of this work is making sure that equipment is built to common standards. Since World War Two, Australia has worked to maximise inter-operability with the US, meaning that its equipment needs to meet NATO standards. Australia buying very expensive and highly technical equipment like frigates from Japan indicates the trend towards increasing technological integration between the US, NATO and the alliance’s four Indo-Pacific Partners; Australia, South Korea, Japan and New Zealand. If Japanese ships did not meet NATO’s standards, they would not be suitable for Australian use. This procurement indicates that Japanese ships do meet this standard. Likewise, Australia’s purchase of South Korean made ‘Redback’ armoured fighting vehicles is also an example of how another NATO Indo-Pacific partner’s defence industry is developing equipment that is inter-operable in a NATO environment A notable point relating to inter-operability is that these ships will be equipped to work within an AEGIS capable task force. AEGIS is the US Navy’s standard air defence surveillance and fire control network. The system integrates all AEGIS equipped vessels operating together into one digitised combat network. Sharing information with each other instantly, and even guiding missiles launched by other ships to their targets. The AEGIS system allows many warships to operate together as a completely integrated team. Several aspects of the procurement demonstrate Australia’s security concerns, especially the commitment to quick delivery, and the high-level of capability being bought. The Mogami Class competed against rivals from Spain, Germany and South Korea, and were an expensive option. However, the Japanese warships are larger, more capable and the deal includes prioritisation of production. Australian Defence Industry Minister, Pat Conroy saying the government was confident the new ships would be entering service within the next decade because Japan has already “allocated three production slots for Australia” in their shipbuilding schedule. Exercise Talisman Sabre 2025 finished last week The Australian led multi-national exercise, Talisman Sabre wrapped up this week. The exercise is the largest exercise in the Pacific region this year. It brought together Australian allies and partners from around the world to exercise (and demonstrate) their warfighting capability. Australian Defence Industry Minister Pat Conroy told media that “This is all about extending deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, all about signalling to any potential adversary that pain can be inflicted — all about deterring war through strength.” Exercise Talisman Sabre is also an interesting exercise because it alternates bi-annually with another very large US-led exercise – RIMPAC. Australia’s role leading the exercise indicates that the US trusts it implicitly, and that Australia may be supported by the US to lead large coalition operations in the region. This year’s exercise involved approx. 40,000 service personal from 19 nations and the skills practiced provide insight into how the US, Australia and their allies are preparing for potential conflict: Long-range precision fire is a key capability for Australia. The Australian Army test-fired its new Precision Strike Missile, the US replacement for the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) currently being used in Ukraine. It has a 300km range and is very accurate. The Japanese Self Defence Force also tested its new Type 12 anti-ship missiles and the truck mounted variant successfully engage targets at sea. Concentration of airpower. The exercise brought together approx. 300 aircraft from partner nations. Getting these aircraft from Japan, the US and Europe to Australia required sophisticated logistics planning. An operation that tested air-to-air refuelling, shipping spare parts around the globe and being able to maintain and repair aircraft in the field. Skills and experience required to quickly concentrate airpower to deter a threat. Rapid long-range force projection. A notable activity conducted during the exercise was the rapid deployment of long-range missiles and a security force to Christmas Island, 1,500km off the Australian coast. The ability to immediately move long-range missile systems to remote islands will be an important skill in any future war in the Pacific. By getting your missiles dispersed on the ground first, your side can create area-denial and prevent the opposition from doing the same. Notably this activity involved Australian soldiers, US missiles and Canadian aircraft, a great example of inter-operability. Integration of Papua New Guinean forces. Papua New Guinea Defence forces participated on land, at sea and in the air. Australia is clearly keen to integrate this nation’s military assets within the coalition it is developing. Smaller defence forces like Papua New Guinea provide manpower and local knowledge, while countries like the US and Australia provide digital communications, logistics and long-range firepower. Diplomacy ahead of the Pacific Islands Forum leaders meeting in September A diplomatic scuffle is underway ahead of next month’s Pacific Island Forum’s leaders meeting in Solomon Islands. The situation provides noteworthy insight into Pacific politics, and regional diplomacy. Last year’s forum in Cook Islands was notable because Chinese pressure influenced the removal of references to re-affirming the organisation’s relationship with Taiwan from the post-forum joint statement by leaders. Taiwan’s attendance was discussed before this year’s meeting, and in June the Australian Broadcasting Corporation reported that Taiwanese officials travelling to Solomon Islands to prepare for the meeting in March were denied visas. An incident that created concern about China using its influence in Solomon Islands to exclude Taiwan, a donor or ‘development partner’ of the forum for more than thirty years Now September’s meeting is fast approaching and the last week has been marked by diplomacy. On 5 August, the leaders of Palau, Marshall Islands and Tuvalu expressed their concern that the forum should not let China influence the meeting. Radio New Zealand reporting that “Leaders of the three Pacific nations with diplomatic ties to Taiwan are united in a message to the Pacific Islands Forum that the premier regional body must not allow non-member countries to dictate Forum policies – a reference to the China-Taiwan geopolitical debate.” Then on 7 August, Reuters reported that “Solomon Islands Prime Minister Jeremiah Manele has said that 21 donor countries, including the United States and China, will not be invited to the region’s top political meeting, a move that follows pressure from Beijing to exclude Taiwan.” Solomon Islands appears to have responded to pressure from all sides by exercising its right to not invite any of the forum’s large and influential donors. A pragmatic solution to a thorny problem. The situation is noteworthy because of the role the Pacific Islands Forum plays in the Indo-Pacific region’s security architecture. It provides a diplomatic framework for small Pacific nations to work together with larger nations to address economic, social and defence issues. The forum has a long and successful history of supporting and enabling ‘Pacific solutions to Pacific problems.’ For instance, the forum led Regional Assistance Mission Solomon Islands in 2002 ended a war in the nation, or more recently the forum’s support of the peace process in New Caledonia. In an uncertain future the Pacific Islands Forum provides stability by providing a means for small nations to cooperate and support each other to deal with issues. Diplomatic activity of this nature is concerning because whether the pressure is exerted by China, or by the US its effect is to divide forum membership and encourage a partisan rather than collaborative forum. The best ways to combat this trend are transparency and good governance because external influence is inevitable but if it can be seen, and if decisions are made in an open manner its impacts can be mitigated. Melanesian update A regular update on the Pacific’s least reported trouble spot; Melanesia. New Zealand Prime Minister visits Papua New Guinea, part of a bigger diplomatic picture Last week, New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon visited Papua New Guinea’s celebrations for the 50th anniversary of it achieving independence. Fifty years ago, New Zealand was a strong supporter of Papua New Guinean independence and one of the first nations to recognise the new state. So, it is not surprising that Luxon is visiting, but it is a good example of New Zealand supporting defence partner Australia in its Melanesian diplomatic offensive. Australia’s ‘soft power’ offensive was initiated after Solomon Islands signed a security partnership agreement with China in 2022, the details of which remain secret. The agreement surprised Australia and since then the nation is actively involved in building relationships across Melanesia. Some examples relevant to Papua New Guinea include; sponsoring a Papua New Guinea rugby league team in the Australian national competition, appointing Papua New Guinean officers into senior positions in Australian military formations, providing AS$ 570 million in financial aid, integrating Papua New Guinea into large Australian military exercises, and AS$400 million towards the ‘Pacific Policing Initiative’ that includes a hub in Papua New Guinea. The ‘soft power’ offensive appears to be successful, Papua New Guinean politicians praising Australia and the diplomatic relationship becoming stronger. A point noted in an article ‘Australia-PNG relations at 50: Pride, politics and the price of partnership’ in the Lowry Institute’s blog – The Interpreter in June that states “In fact, it’s hard to recall a period when bilateral ties have been stronger, or PNG ministers more effusive in their praise of Australia’s support for their country.” Notably, Papua New Guinea’s pro-Australia Prime Minister James Marape also recently survived a ‘no-confidence’ motion in parliament. An indication that the strengthening of relations with Australia, New Zealand and the US is supported more widely in domestic political circles. New Zealand and Australia are allies and Prime Ministerial visits are a fantastic way to build relationships with partners. The visit reminds us of the close relationship between Australia and New Zealand and of the important role they play supporting each other in the region.