Following 12 days of intense military confrontation between Israel and Iran, a fragile U.S.-brokered ceasefire has taken hold. While President Donald Trump hailed the agreement as a diplomatic victory, experts warn the pause may be a strategic timeout rather than a turning point. Despite targeted strikes on Fordow and Natanz, Iran’s uranium stockpiles, covert infrastructure and long-term ambitions suggest the nuclear crisis is far from over. “We ignored this repeatedly,” said Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC). “And we ignored it in the case of Iran, just as we did with India and North Korea. In both cases, we failed to enforce rules and watched as they became nuclear powers,” he added. “The Iranians still have more than 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%. They retain the capability to reach 90%, which is the military threshold,” said Dr. Arié Bensemhoun, CEO of ELNET France. “They’ve lost facilities—but not the knowledge, the stockpile or the intent.” Sokolski emphasized that the current nuclear emergency did not emerge out of nowhere. He traced it back to long-standing policy failures dating to the 1946 Acheson-Lilienthal Commission. Since its founding in 1994, NPEC has been a leading voice warning about the military risks embedded in civilian nuclear programs. Under Sokolski’s leadership, the center published landmark studies such as Getting Ready for a Nuclear Ready Iran (2005) and Serious Rules for Nuclear Power Without Proliferation (2016), both of which examine how enrichment and reprocessing facilities can be redirected toward weaponization. “There’s this enduring myth that you can cleanly separate civilian and military nuclear technologies,” Sokolski said. “But enrichment and reprocessing are inherently dual-use. Once you allow those activities, the line becomes almost meaningless,” he added. In addition to its publications, NPEC has used high-level simulations and strategic modeling to anticipate proliferation crises. A three-day “Iran NPT Wargame” conducted in 2021 explored scenarios in which Tehran excludes IAEA monitors, delays inspections and exploits diplomatic loopholes—scenarios that now appear to be playing out. Its 2024 “Nuclear Proliferation’s Next Iteration” war game warned that Iran’s nuclear system had effectively become dual-use: civilian on paper, but convertible to military use within months. “Iran learned to exploit every gray area in the treaty system,” Sokolski said. “They played just close enough to the line to claim legality while moving steadily toward breakout capacity.” A recurring theme in NPEC’s work is skepticism toward the international community’s reliance on inspections alone. Iran’s use of the JCPOA’s 24-day inspection delay clause, its selective transparency and its concealment tactics have led the center to argue that such systems, while symbolically important, are practically insufficient. “You can’t inspect your way out of a determined nuclear weapons program,” he warned. “By the time inspectors detect anything, it may already be too late.” The United States coordinated the ceasefire on Tuesday, but both sides had already violated its terms. “It’s a ceasefire imposed by Donald Trump. The parties don’t truly want it, but they had to accept it. The regime will use this time to regroup, not surrender,” Bensemhoun said. Despite claims of success from U.S. and Israeli strikes, both experts caution against overstating the outcome. Satellite imagery showed Iranian personnel removing material from Fordow and Natanz before the attacks. “Of course, we don’t know where that material went,” Sokolski remarked. “That uncertainty is part of the problem. These sites are incredibly hard to monitor. A little diversion here and there can go unnoticed—and that’s enough.” “Israel did an amazing job these past days, and the United States helped to accomplish the final steps, but before the U.S. strikes, images showed trucks leaving with enriched uranium. They likely have hidden sites. Rebuilding could take months for them, not years,” Bensemhoun added. At the center of the crisis is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—a framework Sokolski says has been undermined by decades of diplomatic compromise. “North Korea left the NPT with impunity. … You shouldn’t be allowed to exit a treaty while in violation. There must be consequences,” he said. NPEC has long warned that past failures—in the cases of India, Pakistan and North Korea—set dangerous precedents. Bensemhoun agrees that the NPT’s credibility has suffered. “They forfeited their place in the club of peaceful nuclear nations. We must link new talks to total dismantlement—no partial measures,” he said. With Iran’s capabilities constrained but not dismantled, both experts fear a ripple effect across the region. “Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE, Turkey … if we fail again, we normalize proliferation,” Sokolski said. “If Iran continues, Saudi demands parity. Others follow. If states can’t build, they’ll buy—Pakistan and North Korea are open backdoors,” added Bensemhoun. Longstanding alliances and past knowledge transfers further complicate efforts to contain the spread. “Pakistan and North Korea assisted Iran before. Intelligence hints it may still be ongoing. Russia could leverage this in Ukraine negotiations,” Bensemhoun warned. “When states violate treaties with no punishment, others quietly assist. That must stop,” said Sokolski. Get the Ynetnews app on your smartphone: Google Play: https://bit.ly/4eJ37pE | Apple App Store: https://bit.ly/3ZL7iNv European reactions to the conflict have been fractured, with domestic politics influencing foreign policy. “Germany supports Israel. France, Spain and Ireland are more cautious—they fear domestic backlash. Internal politics now drive foreign policy. We haven’t fully thought that through as a whole,” Bensemhoun said. He expressed doubt that a popular uprising would unseat Iran’s leadership. “Eighty percent may oppose the government, but they’re not unified. The regime kills dissent. Without a credible voice like Reza Pahlavi, there is no unified movement,” he added. Sokolski declined to speculate on internal Iranian politics. “I don’t know Iranian politics well enough. What matters is ensuring Iran is the last state to exploit peaceful nuclear cover for weapons.” This crisis was not a surprise—it was the foreseeable outcome of policy neglect, inadequate monitoring and treaty erosion. NPEC’s decades of research reinforce two key lessons: fuel-cycle facilities are nearly impossible to supervise once operational, and repeated failures to enforce treaty obligations—especially in the cases of India, Pakistan and North Korea—set the stage for today’s challenge. “There’s always a shortcut in diplomacy—but most of them lead to a veil of tears,” Sokolski said. “We’d better be honest about what we can and can’t do—before it’s too late.” The story is written by Giorgia Valente and reprinted with permission from The Media Line. Follow Ynetnews on Facebook | Twitter | Instagram | Telegram