In 1871, a group of Japanese statesmen boarded the SS America bound for Washington via San Francisco. Traveling on behalf of Japan’s just-formed Meiji government, the members of the Iwakura Mission were determined to renegotiate the “unequal treaty” imposed on Japan by the United States. Two decades earlier, U.S. Navy Commodore Matthew Perry famously used the threat of naval force to open Japan to foreign trade, ending the country’s 250-year-long isolationist foreign policy of sakoku, or “closed country.” After 11 rounds of negotiation with the Grant administration, the Iwakura Mission failed to secure concessions from the United States, including a lack of progress on Japan’s desire to regain tariff autonomy. Last week, more than 150 years later, Japanese trade negotiators found themselves in Washington once again – this time to attempt to spare Tokyo from sweeping tariffs. Governments around the world were watching on the edge of their seats as top U.S. negotiators met with their Japanese counterparts. The discussions were viewed as a litmus test for countries seeking to barter their way out of impending “reciprocal tariffs.” At the last minute, U.S. President Donald Trump inserted himself into the negotiations alongside his top economic advisers. The pressure Japan faced was palpable: images from the meeting showed Tokyo’s envoy, wearing prayer beads on his wrist, seated directly across from Trump in the Oval Office. Yet, unlike Commodore Perry, Japan could not visit Washington with physical arms to force the United States from retreating into its own version of a 21st century sakoku. Instead, just like their Meiji-era predecessors, the Japanese delegation dispatched by Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru found themselves leaving the United States without results. Trump unilaterally declared “big progress” from the talks, but Ishiba did not share his optimism. The Japanese leader’s tone regarding the negotiations became more agitated this week, ruling out the prospect of major Japanese concessions – a poor sign for the next round of talks. In a speech to members of the Japanese Diet, Ishiba also expressed his discontent that U.S. negotiators were attempting to use trade talks to pressure Japan on defense issues. Shortly before the meeting, Trump confirmed that “the cost of military support” to Japan would be raised during talks. The issue of Japan’s financial contribution to basing costs for U.S. troops on Japanese soil has been a personal sticking point for Trump – and an irritant to Tokyo – since his first administration, when he demanded that Japan quadruple its payments for U.S. protection. On paper, Japan is well-positioned to engage in productive talks with its U.S. counterparts. Given Japan’s status as a long-time staunch U.S. security ally, analysts have pointed to the potential geopolitical ramifications for Washington’s influence in Asia if the two sides fail to come to an agreement. After all, Japan hosts tens of thousands of U.S. troops steps away from adversaries Russia, North Korea, and China. Yet, as Tokyo’s response to the first round of talks indicated, in practice, the Trump administration has treated Japan with acrimony more suitable for an adversary than an ally. While an eventual resolution between Tokyo and Washington is probable, the manner in which the Trump administration has conducted itself toward Japan both during and prior to trade negotiations should serve as a warning to U.S. friends and foe alike: no one is safe from the White House’s often incoherent and increasingly isolationist foreign policy and trade agenda. While announcing his “reciprocal tariffs” regime earlier this month, Trump pointedly attacked Japan’s trade restrictions on automobiles, before asserting plainly that “in many cases, the friend is worse than the foe in terms of trade.” That’s a dire warning not only for Tokyo, but for many countries that only a few months ago would have called themselves strong U.S. partners. This belief has manifested several times as blatant falsehoods about Japan’s trade policy promoted by Trump administration officials, and often by the president himself. For example, Trump and his allies, including Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt, have repeatedly decried a supposed 700 percent tariff on rice imposed by Japan. The figure, which is likely based on rice prices from as far back as the late 1990s, has been repeatedly denied by Japanese officials. This did not stop U.S. negotiators from raising the issue in last week’s trade talks. Additionally, immediately after the negotiations he himself lauded, Trump published a list of “non-tariff cheating” on Truth Social. There, he accused Japan of “protective technical standards” over its so-called “bowling ball test.” The test, he has previously claimed, involves dropping a bowling ball from 20 feet in the air to see if it dents the hood of a car. The “bowling ball test” does not exist. For years, Trump has touted the test as an arbitrary safety standard used by the Japanese government in order to lock out U.S. automobile imports. When Trump made the same claim in 2018, then-Press Secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders insisted that the president was joking. Of most serious concern, Trump has repeatedly questioned the foundation of the longstanding Japan-U.S. security alliance, which guarantees the United States basing rights in Japan in exchange for U.S. protection of Japan in the event of a foreign attack. Much like the Iwakura mission decried Japan’s unequal treaty with the U.S. in the 1870s, Trump has said that he believes that the Japan-U.S. security treaty is one-sided, asserting that Japan has no obligation to defend the United States. Similarly, close Trump ally Stephen Miller wrote on X, “Why are American streets filled with cars from Europe and Japan but their streets are empty of American cars? Even as we provide defense and security for both?” The issue of mutual defense is a topic of intense debate in Japan, but Tokyo has historically been a steadfast U.S. security partner. Notably, Japan broke from its legacy of postwar pacifism by authorizing the dispatch of Japanese troops in 2003 to support U.S. operations in Iraq. In 2014, Japan’s government reinterpreted the country’s pacifist constitution to allow for “collective self-defense” – providing a legal basis for Japan to respond with force to an attack on U.S. forces. Additionally, Japan’s ruling party has made significant efforts in recent years to increase defense spending, a Trump administration goal. U.S. Forces Japan is also in the first phase of an upgrade to a joint force headquarters, improving interoperability with the Japanese military. With only one round of talks completed, Trump has already demonstrated that Japan’s historical relationship with the United States, Japan’s compliance with Trump’s own defense goals, and the reality of Japan’s trade policy are all largely irrelevant. The policy of incoherence from the White House – from decrying the Japan-U.S. security alliance while simultaneously upgrading bilateral military cooperation to repeatedly changing stances on a potential Japanese acquisition of U.S. Steel – is sure to be extended to both traditional partners and adversaries alike.