The appointment of American ambassadors to India has long carried weight beyond protocol. Washington has often sent to India some of its heavyweights. Chester Bowles the idealist; Ellsworth Bunker the steady hand; John Kenneth Galbraith the scholar-diplomat who connected with Jawaharlal Nehru; and Harry G. Barnes Jr, admired on both sides for steering a sensitive phase. Set against that lineage, Sergio Gor’s nomination naturally raises eyebrows. Is he a lightweight, or the President’s trusted instrument for a difficult job? He is not the classic envoy. At thirty-eight, a first-generation immigrant from Uzbekistan, Mr Gor rose as Mr Trump’s chief of presidential personnel — the gatekeeper who moved hundreds of appointees in months. He is close to Donald Trump Jr, plugged into the family’s inner circle, and, crucially, carries the President’s confidence. Conventional gravitas he may lack; access he has in abundance. What makes this appointment consequential is the add-on portfolio. Mr Gor is also being positioned as special representative for South and Central Asia, a remit akin to an assistant secretary’s authority but based in New Delhi. The Richard Holbrooke analogy is unavoidable. President Barack Obama’s Af-Pak envoy explicitly hyphenated Afghanistan and Pakistan; India will push back at any hint of an India-Pakistan hyphenation. One of Mr Gor’s first tests will be to dispel that suspicion. President Trump has not named an ambassador to Pakistan yet, prompting speculation that the India post may carry informal oversight of Islamabad. That possibility will worry New Delhi, which has long resisted being bracketed with a neighbour that sponsors terrorism by proxy. The structural antidote is simple: separate reporting lines, distinct deliverables, and clear public messaging that South Asia policy will not be run on hyphenated logic. If Mr Gor can institutionalise that clarity, he will earn trust quickly. Two realities should temper any Indian assessments. First, Mr Trump’s personnel choices are purposeful, but they are rarely permanent. Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster was a celebrated pick as national security adviser, and lasted only months. Elon Musk, once courted, became a combatant. Also, no system tasks an envoy with demolition, and a bureau-level mandate makes demolition even less likely. Mr Gor’s incentives point to problem-solving, not sabotage. That is why the run-up to confirmation matters. The Indian diaspora and serious Indian think tanks — including the India Foundation, Vivekananda International Foundation, ORF and others — should choreograph quiet briefings in Washington. Put Mr Gor in rooms with former Indian envoys, military thinkers, strategic analysts, industry leaders and young technologists who build in both countries. Give him a textured map before he lands in Delhi and Make him India-literate early. Theories swirl about Mr Trump’s motives — personal finance networks, even a Nobel itch tied to claims that he brokered the ceasefire that halted the brief India-Pakistan conflict in May 2025. India has rightly refused third-party mediation on Jammu and Kashmir. More important than the rumour mill is the deeper strategic reading many in South Asia have missed. For over a year, Washington has looked uneasily at an India whose economic heft, technology ambitions and civilisational confidence are rising fast, while the armed forces are still mid-modernisation. The memory of how Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger helped midwife China’s global return — only to see it emerge as a rival — looms large. Many in Washington probably think prudence will be to inject caution early through tariffs, tighter conditionality, and an envoy empowered to “manage” expectations. China drew its own lessons. In 2020 it moved in eastern Ladakh, misreading India’s political consolidation in J&K as strategic hubris to be pricked. That crisis dented trust but hardened Indian resolve. The parallel is instructive. Both Beijing and Washington are signalling that India’s rise must be managed. This does not make them partners in design — but it should make India deliberate in response. The Bangladesh episode -- Sheikh Hasina’s ouster is widely read as encouraged by Washington — adds to the perception of a region-wide pushback on Indian primacy. There is unhelpful speculation about Pahalgam; much of it appears unfounded. But the cumulative effect is a story the neighbourhood hears: India must be shown limits. Delhi’s answer cannot be outrage or retreat; it must be a patient strategy. So how should India work with Sergio Gor? First, absolutely no hyphenation. India cannot and will not be clubbed with Pakistan. Make this a “red line” privately and publicly, and invite Mr Gor to help design guardrails; separate chains of command, and an explicit policy that India is handled on its own terms. Second, keep the economy first. Tariffs hurt both sides. Create a joint fast-track for disputes on market access, digital trade,...