Meeting in France, New Caledonian political leaders have signed an agreement on the political and economic future of the French Pacific dependency. The signing of the Bougival Accord on 12 July, described as “historic” by French President Emmanuel Macron, came after ten days of closed-doors talks in the town of Bougival, on the outskirts of Paris. After years of delay, the finalisation of a consensus agreement is a major achievement. The deal commits signatories from all parliamentary groups to promote the agreed text before their membership and constituencies in New Caledonia (The page of signatures is headed “All partners commit to presenting and defending the text in accordance with the Agreement on the Future of New Caledonia”). Despite this, there will likely be extensive debate in New Caledonia and France before the legal adoption of the deal, and many provisions will be contested by both supporters and opponents of independence in coming months. The agreement foreshadows the creation of a “New Caledonian State” within the French Republic, the transformation of New Caledonian citizenship into New Caledonian nationality, and the future possibility of transferring sovereign powers currently held by the French State to the Government of New Caledonia. The agreement includes key proposals on economic, political and administrative reforms in Noumea, and commitments from Paris on finance and support for the nickel industry – a crucial sector for the economy of the Pacific nation. But the document signed in Bougival is not the final, legally binding agreement. Instead, it sets out a timetable to introduce the key elements of the 12 July framework agreement into law, which must then be taken to a referendum in New Caledonia in early 2026. For more than 25 years New Caledonia’s decolonisation process was governed by the 1998 Noumea Accord, which culminated in a series of three referendums in 2018-2021. But the process was derailed in December 2021, as France rushed through the third referendum during the COVID pandemic and the overwhelming majority of independence supporters refused to participate. In subsequent years, hardline Overseas Ministers like Sébastien Lecornu and Gérald Darmanin introduced policies that alienated independence supporters and exacerbated longstanding social and economic inequality. Then last year, President Macron’s botched electoral reforms triggered a six-month conflict after 13 May, with 14 dead, 2,600 arrests, and key Kanak independence activists sent to prisons across France. The local economy was devastated, as businesses shuttered and one in six people in the private sector lost their jobs. Between February and May this year, under French Overseas Minister Manuel Valls, a series of talks finally brought all parties around the table again. But after Loyalists scuttled the negotiations at the Deva hotel in May, President Macron stepped in to water down provisions of the negotiating text tabled by his own minister, pledging “a new project.” After negotiations re-started on 2 July, basic consensus over key areas was forged between six delegations from New Caledonia. The delegates came from four anti-independence groups (the Loyalists; Rassemblement-Les Républicains; Eveil océanien and Calédonie ensemble), and two independence groups: UC-FLNKS (linking Union Calédonienne and other members of the main FLNKS independence coalition), and Union Nationale pour l’Independance (UNI), which links the Parti de Libération Kanak (Palika) and Union Progréssiste en Mélanésie (UPM). A parallel meeting of business and community leaders debated economic and social reforms. The final deal was only hammered out in lengthy bilateral and trilateral discussions, continuing well into the night of 11-12 July. Despite areas of convergence between supporters and opponents of independence, all parties made significant compromises and concessions, which they must now sell to their members. The preamble to the document says “New Caledonians are once again betting on trust, dialogue, and peace through this agreement, which proposes a new political organisation, greater shared sovereignty, an economic and social reset, and a reinvented destiny together.” Striking a deal New Caledonia has faced years of uncertainty, during the three referendums in 2018-2021, then the COVID pandemic, followed by a crisis in the nickel industry and last year’s conflict between Kanak protestors and French police. Business and community leaders have long pressed for a new political agreement to address these crises, but not everyone will welcome the final deal. On Facebook, Loyalist leader and President of the Southern Province Sonia Backès stated: “This compromise will not fully satisfy anyone. But I am firmly convinced that it allows us to take New Caledonia out of the spiral of violence, uncertainties, and destruction.” Many grassroots independence activists will be sorely disappointed that key demands have not been achieved. The call for full and sovereign political independence has, once again, been deferred. The Southern Province, a bastion of anti-independence forces, will receive new fiscal and administrative powers, and extra seats in an expanded 56-member Congress. In contrast to last May’s proposal from Overseas Minister Manuel Valls, the French State will now retain control of the sovereign powers of policing, courts, currency and defence, rather than transfer them to New Caledonia (albeit with new structures to engage New Caledonians in these areas). Voting rights for local political institutions will be expanded to include more French nationals – a blow to many young people who fought on the barricades last year. But there are also bitter pills for anti-independence forces to swallow. The agreement allows for the creation of the “State of New Caledonia” within the French Republic, through a basic law (loi fondamentale) to be enshrined in the French Constitution. This new State “may be recognised by the international community.” After the next provincial elections in mid-2026, New Caledonia can adopt its own basic law to allow significant legislative changes. This would allow modification of New Caledonia’s national symbols (the name, flag, anthem and motto), as well as development of a citizenship code and a charter of “New Caledonian values.” The new agreement proposes changes to New Caledonia’s parliamentary structure and powers. The Congress will expand from 54 to 56 members, with the possibility of changing the number of constituencies and the distribution of seats between the three provincial assemblies (with reduced representation from the Kanak-majority Loyalty Islands and Northern Provinces). While France will still control the sovereign powers over currency, courts, police and military, the existing shared authority over foreign affairs will be transferred to the Government of New Caledonia. The islands have expanded their “regional integration” (especially since gaining full membership of the Pacific Islands Forum in 2016), so this new foreign affairs power will be welcomed by locals, who have seen trade deals with neighbouring Forum island countries delayed or stymied by French diplomats. However according to the new accord, New Caledonia will conduct its diplomatic actions “in accordance with the international commitments and the interests of France.” This sets up a scenario for disputes over issues such as nuclear disarmament, maritime boundaries, trade policy and the nickel industry, as France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy clashes with New Caledonian regional priorities (for example, during President’s Macron’s recent visit to Jakarta, France announced that it would expand arms sales to the government led by President Prabowo Subianto – even as the FLNKS criticises Indonesian police and military forces for human rights violations in West Papua). While France retains control of the courts and police, provisions of the Bougival deal allow for the creation of provincial and community policing. This may allow for changes to the regular deployment of gendarmes from France, such as those who fought Kanak protestors and rioters last year. There is a long history of racist and militarised policing in New Caledonia, and more than 90% of prisoners in the Camp Est prison are indigenous Kanak (Remedial action from Paris is always a problem – France’s 2024 pledge to build a new prison has now been deferred till at least 2032, according to a recent parliamentary inquiry). These policing provisions may also create complex dynamics in Kanak-majority areas, given the experience of community policing in neighbouring Melanesian states (there are mixed attitudes from women’s and youth groups towards customary-controlled initiatives, with many wary of more conservative values promoted by community elders). Under the Bougival deal, a pact on economic rebuilding proposes to “facilitate the export of nickel ore as part of a ‘renewed nickel doctrine’,” and to resume value-adding through local smelters or the Northern Province’s offshore plants in Korea and China. Once again, there is a tension between French and New Caledonian interests. Currently, the major importers of New Caledonian nickel ore are all Asia-Pacific nations (China, Korea, Japan, Taiwan and Australia). In contrast, President Macron has argued that New Caledonia’s vast reserves of nickel ore are “a major strategic resource for France and Europe, at a time when we have embarked on a massive reindustrialisation effort….Nickel must be taken into account in European legislation on critical strategic materials.” What strings will come with renewed French assistance for this crucial sector? A New Caledonian state Even before the ink was dry on the agreement, Loyalist politicians leapt to social media to assure supporters that all was well. On Facebook, Virginie Ruffenach of the anti-independence Rassemblement-Les Républicains party noted: “Be sure that we will not accept the unacceptable and that our French nationality is non-negotiable.” On 12 July, Loyalist deputy Nicolas Metzdorf tweeted: “Agreement signed. For New Caledonia in France.” But the Bougival agreement commits to the transformation of the existing New Caledonian citizenship – established by the 1998 Noumea Accord – into “New Caledonian nationality.” After the next provincial elections, the incoming Congress can define the new nationality, to be open to people born of a New Caledonian parent or meeting detailed residency requirements. It will allow dual nationality, French and New Caledonian. The creation of a new state within the “indivisible French Republic” and a new nationality is a unique and fundamental shift in French constitutional law (one that will be noted by independence movements in Corica, Guadeloupe, French Polynesia and other French colonies). However, some members of the independence movement may be angered about the reframing of the decolonisation process within French law, without more explicit commitment to UN decolonisation principles under international law. Many New Caledonians will welcome the agreement as a circuit breaker after years of tension. But as New Caledonian leaders fly home to explain the proposed changes to their supporters, it’s clear that the Bougival signatories won’t have an easy task selling the compromises involved in the deal. The FLNKS coalition, linking Union Calédonienne (UC) with smaller independence parties, will soon hold a Congress to consider the agreement. The FLNKS negotiators – Emmanuel Tjibaou, Roch Wamytan, Omayra Naisseline, Mickael Forrest and Aloisio Sako – may face criticism from activists concerned they exceeded their negotiating mandate. After the signing, UC President and FLNKS delegation leader Emmanuel Tjibaou said: “We are going to be insulted, threatened, because we chose a different path, that was not the indefinite and unknown status quo within France, but also that was not an immediate solution to achieve full sovereignty. It was a necessary convergence of interests, to express how much we are all attached to this territory.” On the Right, leading French politicians and pundits are already denouncing the Loyalist compromises as a betrayal of French Republican values. Despite the carefully worded text, some French conservatives see the creation of a New Caledonian nationality as another step on the road to independence. After the signing, President of New Caledonia Alcide Ponga – a leader of the anti-independence Rassemblement party – told local TV: “We are going to take the plane home and when we land – well, there are no Indians and cowboys at home, but there are archers waiting for us on either side. We will do the work to explain the agreement, but it will be hard work on both sides.” Timing for change Beyond these political debates, the introduction of these political, economic and constitutional changes is mapped out in a very tight timetable. This could be difficult given key provisions of the deal may require extensive political education in communities still reeling from six months of divisive conflict last year. In September or October, a joint sitting of the French National Assembly and French Senate would be held at the Palace of Versailles, to adopt a basic law that codifies provisions of the Bougival Accord, in order to replace the 1999 law that introduced the 1998 Noumea Accord into the French Constitution. Even though most French parliamentarians will back the consensus proposed by New Caledonian leaders, the timing of this joint sitting could be disrupted by domestic politics in Paris. The French government under Prime Minister François Bayrou could face a no confidence motion during September’s budgetary debates, which would derail the timing of necessary constitutional changes for France’s colony on the other side of the world. If adopted this year in France, New Caledonians would then be called to the polls three times in the first half of 2026. Firstly, in February, New Caledonians would vote in a referendum on whether to adopt the Bougival reforms introduced into law in Paris. The accord proposes that this poll would use the special electoral rolls created for the 2018 referendum under the Noumea Accord. Then in March, people would go to scheduled municipal elections – an important test of the balance of forces within and between the independence and Loyalist blocs. In the North and Loyalty Islands Provinces, control of town councils and mayoralties is hotly contested by independence parties such as UC, Palika, UPM and Parti Travailliste (PT). In the South, there is fratricidal warfare between the Loyalist-Rassemblement bloc and smaller anti-independence parties like Eveil océanien and Calédonie ensemble, especially for control of the Noumea Town Hall. The Bougival timetable also requires changes to the timing of elections for New Caledonia’s three provincial assemblies and national Congress. These were already deferred from May 2024 until 30 November this year, because of last year’s political crisis. They must now be delayed again to allow legal changes to the electoral rolls. The provincial elections will now likely be held over two rounds in May-June 2026, under reformed electoral rolls that would include New Caledonian-born voters and those resident for 15 years (a provision likely to anger some young activists who fought on the barricades last year to halt the opening of the electoral rolls, but also partisans of France who want the complete “unfreezing” of residency requirements to allow all French nationals to vote). So the “historic agreement” has a long way to go, and the timetable for the deal struck on 12 July may be hostage to wider national and global forces. New Caledonia is rolling the dice in “a bet on trust.”